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BUSINESS, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND THE ROBERTS 
COURT: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 
Jonathan H. Adler* 
It did not take long for the Roberts Court to earn its reputation as a 
“pro-business” Court.  Even before publication of Jeffrey Rosen’s 
much-discussed New York Times Magazine article, Supreme Court, 
Inc.,1 many commentators had proclaimed that this Court looks out for 
business.  Indeed, some were ready to make this charge before the 
current Court had sat two full terms together.2  According to these 
accounts, the addition of Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate 
Justice Samuel Alito has made the Court more receptive to business 
interests, and more likely to side with corporations against individual 
 
*Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law.  This paper was prepared for the Santa Clara Law 
Review symposium on “Big Business and the Roberts Court,” January 23, 2009.  The author 
would like to thank Ted Frank and Michael Greve for comments on a draft of this article.  
The author is responsible for any remaining error or inanities. 
 1. Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, § MM 
(Magazine), at 38.  This article provoked substantial commentary and criticism, some of 
which is discussed in a series of posts, see Posting of Jonathan Adler, Ilya Somin, & Eugene 
Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/chain_1205805605.shtml (Mar. 
17, 2008, 22:10–Mar. 20, 2008, 00:18). 
 2. See, e.g, Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 423, 
432–37 (2007) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply] (explaining that the 
“conservatism” of the Roberts Court was “manifest in its being more protective of business 
interests than its recent predecessors”); see also Robert Barnes & Carrie Johnson, Pro-
Business Decision Hews to Pattern of Roberts Court, WASH. POST, Jun. 22, 2007, at D01; 
Business Reigns Supreme, WASH. POST, July 1, 2007, at F03; Nick Timiraos, Hot Topic: 
Roberts Court Unites on Business, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2007, at A5 (“The first full term of 
the Roberts Court ended this past week with rulings that pushed the law in a direction 
favored by business.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court: Sharp Turn to the Right, 
CAL. B. J., August 2007, 
http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_cbj.jsp?sCategoryPath=/Home/Attorney%20Resourc
es/California%20Bar%20Journal/August2007&sCatHtmlPath=cbj/2007-
08_TH_01_supremecourt.html&sCatHtmlTitle=Top%20Headlines; Tony Mauro, High 
Court Reveals a Mind for Business, LEGAL TIMES, July 2, 2007, 
http://www.wlf.org/upload/070207legaltimes.pdf.  These commentaries appeared at or near 
the end of the Supreme Court’s October 2006 term.  At this point, John Roberts had been 
Chief Justice for two terms, but Samuel Alito had only been an associate justice for a term 
and a half.  The Senate confirmed Justice Alito on January 31, 2006. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1351906
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employees or consumers.3 
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the claim that the Roberts 
Court is “pro-business” with particular attention to the Court’s 
approach to business concerns in environmental law cases.  This is 
necessarily a tentative enterprise.  As of this writing, the Roberts Court 
has been together for fewer than four full terms.4  The Court has 
decided only sixteen environmental cases, and two potentially 
significant business-related environmental cases are pending.  
Nevertheless, examination of the environmental law cases decided to 
date may help illuminate the extent of the Court’s concern for business 
interests. 
Environmental law cases often pit business interests against other 
social values, such as public health and welfare, species preservation, 
and resource conservation.  Environmental cases almost always involve 
business litigants, if not as parties then as amici curiae.  Even where 
business groups are not directly involved, environmental law decisions 
tend to have implications for the way business is conducted.  
Environmental law decisions can have substantial economic impacts on 
corporations, resource-dependent communities, and private 
landowners. 
Reviewing the environmental law decisions of the Roberts Court 
to date reveals no evidence of a “pro-business” bias.  This does not 
disprove the claim that the Roberts Court is pro-business.  There are 
relatively few data points, so the lack of evidence for a pro-business 
orientation could be an artifact of the specific mix of environmental 
cases heard by the Court.  While the sixteen environmental cases 
decided to date implicate several major environmental statutes and 
span a wide range of legal issues, there is no reason to assume these 
cases are broadly representative of the field.  It is possible that the 
business claims in these cases were not particularly strong, or that any 
concern for business was outweighed by other preferences, perhaps 
even a preference for greater environmental protection.  Nonetheless, 
the lack of evidence for a pro-business orientation may offer some 
indication of how this Court will approach business claims in the 
context of environmental law in the years ahead. 
The next section of this article considers what it could mean to say 
that the Roberts Court is “pro-business,” and identifies several 
 
 3. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply, supra note 2, at 424 (“[T]he Court tended 
to favor businesses over employees and consumers.”). 
 4. The enterprise is particularly tentative because of the Court’s small docket.  With 
fewer cases decided each term, the likelihood that any given term (or combination of terms) 
is representative of the Court’s overall orientation is reduced. 
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qualifications that should be attached to any such claims.  Part III then 
turns to the environmental law decisions of the Roberts Court, and 
explains how these decisions, taken as a whole, do not support the 
claim that the Roberts Court is “pro-business.”  The paper then 
concludes by considering other possible explanations for the pattern of 
decisions in the Court’s environmental law cases. 
I. IS THE ROBERTS COURT “PRO-BUSINESS”? 
Claims that the Roberts Court is a “pro-business” court are quite 
common.  In Supreme Court, Inc., Rosen claimed that the Court has 
become exceedingly sympathetic to business concerns.5  A subsequent 
New York Times editorial decried the Roberts Court’s “reputation for 
being reflexively pro-business.”6  Kiplinger reported that a “pro-
business judiciary” is likely to be among the most significant legacies 
of the Bush Administration.7  A reporter for ProPublica lamented, 
“pro-worker decisions have so far been exceptions in a pro-business 
record.”8  Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has gone further, claiming “the 
Roberts Court is the most pro-business Court of any since the mid-
1930s.”9 
The Roberts Court appears to have taken a greater interest in 
business-related cases than prior courts.10  Such cases have accounted 
for one-third to one-half of the Court’s docket in recent years.11  The 
shrunken size of the Court’s docket further serves to magnify this 
apparent trend (though it also makes the mix of cases each term less 
 
 5. Rosen, supra note 1. 
 6. Editorial, The Court and Workers, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2008, at A18. 
 7. Jonathan Crawford, Bush’s Lasting Legacy: A Pro-Business Judiciary, KIPLINGER 
BUS. FORECAST, Mar. 10, 2008, 
http://www.kiplinger.com/businessresource/forecast/archive/Bush_Leaves_a_Lasting_Legac
y_080310.html. 
 8. Chisun Lee, Another Economic Election Issue: Supreme Court Nominations, 
PROPUBLICA, Oct. 17, 2008, http://www.propublica.org/article/another-economic-election-
issue-supreme-court-nominations-1017. 
 9. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947, 
962 (2008).  For a response to this article, see Jonathan H. Adler, Getting the Roberts Court 
Right: A Response to Chemerinsky, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 983 (2008). 
 10. Michael Greve, Does the Court Mean Business?, FEDERALIST OUTLOOK, Sept. 
2007, at 1 (“The Court’s increased attention to business related cases—even as its overall 
docket has continued to shrink—is indeed eye-catching.”). 
 11. There is some imprecision in the numbers because not all commentators define 
“business-related” in the same way.  See Greve, supra note 10, at 1 (“In the 2006 term, 
twenty-five of sixty-seven cases dealt with business-related issues.”); Rosen, supra note 1 
(“Forty percent of the cases the court heard last term involved business interests, up from 
around 30 percent in recent years.”); Mauro, supra note 2 (“Fully half of the Court’s 71 
cases involved business.”). 
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representative of the Court’s work overall).  Whereas the Court would 
hear approximately 150 cases per term in the 1980s, the Court issued 
opinions in fewer than seventy cases in October Terms 2006 and 2007.  
As the Court takes fewer total cases, the same number of business-
related cases occupy a greater share of the Court’s work, heightening 
the perception that the business of this Court is the law of business. 
Most of those who charge that the Robert Courts is “pro-business” 
no doubt mean something more than that the Court is more interested 
in resolving business-related legal disputes.  Rosen, for instance, 
characterizes the Court’s recent pro-business tilt as an “ideological sea 
change” from prior eras in which the Court was more sympathetic to 
“progressive and consumer groups.”12  Dean Chemerinsky argues the 
Court tends “to favor business over employees and consumers.”13 
Decisions in which a corporation prevails are taken as evidence 
that the Court is pro-business.  Rosen notes that the litigation arm of 
the Chamber of Commerce has fared particularly well in recent terms.14  
But knowing that private companies were on one side or another of a 
given case may not tell us all that much by itself.  Many areas of 
business law routinely pit corporations against each other, and many 
businesses stand to gain from regulatory or judicial intervention in the 
economy.  Some business groups were among those supporting the 
petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA,15 but few would argue that the 
Court’s decision to unleash federal regulation of greenhouse gases was 
“pro-business.”  Furthermore, knowing that the Chamber of Commerce 
has been a successful litigant or amicus curiae could say as much about 
their selection of cases—or even the legal merits of the arguments—as 
it does about the Court’s orientation.16 
Consider, briefly, the Court’s antitrust decisions, which many 
 
 12. Rosen, supra note 1. 
 13. Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply, supra note 2, at 424. 
 14. Rosen, supra note 1. 
 15. Among those organizations that originally petitioned the EPA to regulate 
greenhouse gases in 1999 were Applied Power Technologies, Bio-Fuels America, the 
California Solar Energy Industries Association, Clements Environmental Corporation, New 
Mexico Solar Energy Association, and Solar Energy Industries Association. See 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511 n.15 (2007).  Among the organizations and 
corporations filing briefs in support of the petitioners in the case were the Aspen Skiing 
Corporation, Calpine Corporation, and Entergy Corporation. 
 16. For instance, a review of the cases in which the Chamber participated before the 
Supreme Court shows that participation by the Solicitor General’s office appears to be a 
better predictor of whether the “pro-business” side will prevail in a given case.  See 
generally Robin S. Conrad, The Roberts Court and the Myth of a Pro-Business Bias, 49 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. XX (2009); Sri Srinivasan & Bradley W. Joondeph, Business, the 
Roberts Court, and the Solicitor General: Why the Recent Supreme Court’s Decisions May 
Not Reveal Very Much, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. XX (2009).   
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commentators have pointed to as evidence of the Court’s emerging pro-
business orientation.  Rosen, for instance, reported that “the Roberts 
Court has heard seven [antitrust cases] in its first two terms—and all of 
them were decided in favor of the corporate defendants.”17  This is true.  
But the plaintiffs in all but one of these cases were businesses as well.18  
So while businesses have tended to prevail in the Roberts Court’s 
antitrust decisions, they have tended to lose as well.19  Because antitrust 
cases tend to “pit business against business,” as Rosen acknowledges,20 
knowing the identity of the prevailing party does not tell us much about 
whether the decisions are “pro-business.”  Moreover, plaintiff or 
defendant win rates tell us very little about the underlying merits of the 
cases.21  Unless one assumes that the Court’s cases in any given area 
represent a random sample of the available cases, which is unlikely, 
any analysis must account for the merits of the underlying cases.  
Reversing an outlier pro-plaintiff decision from the Ninth Circuit22 is 
not the same as overturning decades of settled law to benefit 
defendants,23 yet a pure quantitative analysis focusing on prevailing 
parties could conflate the two. 
A more nuanced assessment of these cases could note that, in the 
aggregate, they tend to make it more difficult to challenge business 
practices as anti-competitive.  Dean Chemerinsky, for instance, notes 
that several of the Roberts Court cases have made it “much more 
difficult to sue businesses for antitrust violations.”24  Yet this does not 
mean that the Court’s antitrust decisions are “pro-business.”  Many 
antitrust scholars suggest that the Roberts Court is not as much “pro-
 
 17. Rosen, supra note 1. 
 18. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 19. See Posting of Josh Wright to Truth on the Market, 
http://www.truthonthemarket.com/index.php?s=Are+the+Roberts+Court+Antitrust+Decisio
ns+Really+Pro-Business%3F (Mar. 20, 2008, 17:55). 
 20. Rosen, supra note 1. 
 21. See Posting of Josh Wright to Truth on the Market, 
http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2008/10/14/abuse-of-plaintiff-win-rates-as-evidence-that-
antitrust-law-is-too-lenient/ (Oct. 14, 2008, 12:22). 
 22. See, e.g., Volvo Trucks N. Am. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006) 
(overturning Ninth Circuit decision holding that Robinson-Patman Act’s prohibition on 
price discrimination applies to special order products made for and sold to pre-identified 
customers after process of competitive bidding); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) 
(overturning Ninth Circuit decision that it could be per se illegal under §1 of the Sherman 
Act for a lawful, economically integrated joint venture to set the prices at which it sells its 
products). 
 23. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) 
(overturning Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Jon D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911) which had 
held vertical price restraints are per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
 24. Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply, supra note 2, at 436. 
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business,” as it is “pro-consumer welfare” and, consequently, “pro-
market.”  From this perspective, the Roberts Court has internalized the 
insights of the Chicago School of antitrust analysis and seeks to 
prevent legal challenges to pro-competitive business arrangements.25  
Thus, Judge Douglas Ginsburg and Leah Brannon argue that the 
Roberts Court is “methodically re-working antitrust doctrine to bring it 
into alignment with modern economic understanding.”26  From this 
perspective, the pro-business or pro-defendant pattern of the Roberts 
Court’s antitrust decisions could just as easily be described as “pro-
consumer” or “pro-competition.” 
The foregoing highlights that when evaluating claims that the 
Roberts Court is “pro-business” it is important to ask “compared to 
what?”  Depending upon one’s baseline, the claim that a court is “pro-
business” can mean quite different things. There is a difference 
between eliminating a long-standing cause of action against business 
defendants and refusing to open the door to a new generation of suits 
against corporations.  Both are, in a sense, “pro-business,” but they are 
quite distinct. 
The current Court may look overly sympathetic to business when 
compared to the progressive crusading of some prior Courts.  As Rosen 
notes, there is no justice ready to follow William O. Douglas’ counsel 
to “bend the law in favor of the environment and against the 
corporations.”27 Yet this hardly makes Chief Justice Roberts or Justice 
Alito reincarnations of the pre-New Deal Horsemen.  Thus far there is 
little evidence that either of the newest justices—or any of the current 
justices for that matter—is particularly eager to bend the law and 
stretch conventional legal doctrines for the benefit of businesses.  With 
the possible exception of the Court’s punitive damages decisions (some 
of which, incidentally, actually pre-date the Roberts Court),28 the Court 
has steered away from developing or enforcing constitutional rules that 
would preclude regulation or sanction of business activities. 
It is likewise important to consider whether in rendering “pro-
business” decisions the Court is itself shifting the law in a pro-business 
direction or merely ratifying a pro-business legislative deal or 
administrative ruling.  While the former may be evidence of an actual 
 
 25. See generally Joshua D. Wright, The Roberts Court and the Chicago School of 
Antitrust: The 2006 Term and Beyond, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2007, at 25. 
 26. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Leah Brannon, Antitrust Decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 1967 to 2007, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Autumn 2007, at XX, XX. 
 27. Rosen, supra note 1 (quoting William O. Douglas). 
 28. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (holding “grossly 
excessive” punitive damage awards violate Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
SANTACLARAEDIT.DOCADLER_3_TYPESET_0226 4/13/20094/9/2009  5:50 PM5:45 PM 
2009] A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 107 
“pro-business” bias, the latter may illustrate nothing more than 
deference to the political branches, and may only yield “pro-business” 
outcomes so long as the political branches are sympathetic to business 
interests.  A highly deferential court may seem quite “pro-business” 
when upholding the decisions of Republican-controlled agencies, but 
much less so once a Democratic administration is in control.  Data 
showing that the Court often sides with the Solicitor General’s office in 
business cases could well be evidence that the Court is more deferential 
to the federal government than it is objectively “pro-business.”  
Moreover, a more nuanced examination of the pattern of decisions in 
business-related cases may reveal that what appears to be a “pro-
business” orientation may be something else entirely.29 
Another distinction to keep in mind is whether the Court is 
adopting business-friendly default rules, or entrenching pro-business 
rules.  So, for instance, there is a meaningful difference between 
decisions in which the Court adopts a statutory interpretation favored 
by business interests, and which Congress retains the ability to overturn 
(as with Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.30), and decisions in 
which the Court announces a substantive rule of constitutional law that 
benefits business (as in some of the punitive damages cases).  In the 
former instance the Court may be doing nothing more than deferring to 
the legislature on whether to shift the law in a less business-friendly 
direction.  In the latter, the Court is entrenching a substantive rule that 
will benefit business forever.  Thus, in Stoneridge Investment Partners, 
L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the Court rejected the invitation to 
recognize “scheme liability” for securities fraud.31  The Warren Court 
may have been less reluctant to open the door to such litigation, yet 
there is nothing in Justice Kennedy’s Stoneridge opinion that would 
preclude Congress from authorizing such suits in the future.  Insofar as 
the vast majority of cases in which the Roberts Court has adopted “pro-
business” outcomes are subject to legislative or administrative 
override, this should inform our assessment of the extent to which it is 
a meaningfully “pro-business” court, particularly as recent political 
trends may portend a less business-friendly legislative and executive 
 
 29. For example, former Solicitor General Kenneth Starr suggests that the business 
cases show that the Court “is not so much pro-business as it is massively skeptical of civil 
litigation, especially nationwide civil litigation.”  Kenneth W. Starr, The Roberts Court and 
the Business Cases, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 541, 541 (2008). 
 30. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).  Congress 
subsequently overturned this decision with the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.  See Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html?hp. 
 31. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2007). 
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branch. 
Given the limited period of time to evaluate the Roberts Court’s 
approach to business cases, any assessment is necessarily tentative.  
After the Court’s 2007 decision in Ledbetter32 many were ready to 
claim the Court favors business employers over employees.  Yet in 
several subsequent employment discrimination cases, the Court sided 
with employees.33  Generalizations about the Court’s approach to 
employment discrimination based upon Ledbetter were premature and 
inaccurate.  Because the Roberts Court is still a work in progress, any 
conclusory assessment may come with an expiration date. 
With all of the above qualifications in mind, I am willing to offer 
a tentative assessment of the Court’s posture toward business cases.  To 
the extent that the Roberts Court is pro-business, it is so not because it 
has embraced an aggressive agenda to either impose constitutional 
constraints on the government’s power to regulate economic activity, 
or to rewrite the law to favor business interests.  Rather, the Roberts 
Court can be called “pro-business” insofar as it is sympathetic to some 
basic business-oriented legal claims, reads statutes narrowly, resists 
finding implied causes of action, has adopted a skeptical view of 
antitrust complaints, and does not place its finger on the scales to assist 
non-business litigants.  This approach is highly deferential to the 
political branches, particularly the legislature, and will produce “pro-
business” results only insofar as the other branches adopt or maintain 
relatively business-friendly postures.  With a more interventionist 
Congress or less sympathetic Solicitor General’s office, this approach 
might not be “pro-business” at all. 
II. ARE THE ROBERTS COURT’S ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS “PRO-
BUSINESS”? 
Environmental cases have been a small, but significant, portion of 
the Roberts Court’s docket.  The Court decided thirteen environmental 
law cases in its first three years.  It further agreed to hear five 
environmental cases in the October Term 2008, three of which have 
been decided as of the time of this writing.  The eighteen 
environmental cases heard by the Roberts Court are listed in table 1.34 
 
 32. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
 33. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 129 S. Ct. 846 
(2009); CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 
S. Ct. 1931 (2008); Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008). 
34 For purposes of this study, I opted not to include United States v. Navajo Nation as an 
“environmental” case.  While this case involved a dispute over royalties for a coal lease on 
Indian lands, it did not involve any significant environmental issues.  Had it been included, 
however, it would have been considered a “pro-business” decision in which the 
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As already noted, this is an admittedly small set of cases from 
which to draw definitive conclusions, but they can form the basis of a 
preliminary assessment.  Another important qualification is that 
viewing environmental cases as posing business interests on one side 
and environmental interests on the other is overly simplistic.  
Environmental policy decisions tend to benefit some business interests 
even as they may impose costs on others.35  Enactment of some federal 
environmental laws was actively supported by some corporate 
interests.  Indeed, the federalization of environmental law was driven, 
in part, by national firms that sought to displace variable and 
potentially more stringent state standards.36  In some cases, business 
interests have sought to use regulatory policy as a means of achieving 
comparative advantage, often by disadvantaging competitors.37  
Environmental controversies often pit one set of industry groups 
against another, as when incinerators and cement kilns faced off on air 
emission standards or oil and agribusiness fight over energy policy.38  
As noted above, businesses that expect to gain financially from the 
imposition of regulatory controls on greenhouse gases supported the 
petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA, even if the majority of the 
business community was on the other side.39 
Despite the prevalence of business interests on all sides of many 
environmental issues, it is fair to say that in most environmental cases 
before the Supreme Court it is possible to identify the position that is 
supported by the balance of business groups and that will produce a 
rule that, on the whole, works to the benefit of business.  Such 
decisions may well have other beneficiaries, and may not be motivated 
by any concern for business interests, but they can nonetheless be 
evaluated based upon their effect upon the business community.  
 
government’s position also prevailed.  See United States v. Navajo Nation, __ S.Ct. __ 
(2009).  
 35. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 
(Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith Jr. eds., 1992); Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty 
Profits: Rent-Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, in POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM 1 
(Terry L. Anderson ed., 2000) [hereinafter Adler, Clean Politics]; Todd J. Zywicki, 
Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of 
Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845 (1999). 
 36. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman, & John C. Millian, Toward  a 
Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON & 
ORG. 313, 326-9 (1985); see also Adler, Clean Politics, supra note 35;  
David Schoenbrod, Why States, Not EPA, Should Set Pollution Standards, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
FEDERALISM 260-62 (Terry L. Anderson and P.J. Hill eds. 1997).. 
 37. See infra note 35 and sources cited therein. 
 38. See Adler, Clean Politics, supra note 35. 
 39. See infra note 15.  See also, generally, Stuart Buck & Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers, 
Baptists, and the  Global Warming Battle, 26 HARV. ENV. L. REV. 177 (2002). 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, whether a given case embodies 
a “pro-business” outcome is an entirely different question from 
whether the decision was substantively correct.  For the purposes of 
this paper, labeling a decision as “pro-business” is not a proxy for the 
merits.  The merits of the cases, individually or as a whole, are a 
subject for another paper. 
Taken together, the Roberts Court’s decisions in environmental 
cases show no evidence of a “pro-business” bias or orientation.  The 
Roberts Court adopted what could be considered the “pro-business” 
position in eight of the sixteen environmental cases it has decided thus 
far.40  If we step back from the numbers, and consider the substantive 
effects of the cases, there is even less evidence of a business-friendly 
approach.  Most of the business wins occurred in relatively narrow 
cases that had little effect on pre-existing law, while several of the 
losses were quite dramatic and will have profound effects on economic 
interests.  The aggregate effect of the pro-business decisions on 
environmental law and future environmental litigation will be quite 
meager, while the less business-friendly decisions could have 
substantial legal and practical consequences for many years to come. 
Consider the three most significant business “wins” in 
environmental cases decided in the past three years: Exxon Shipping 
Co. v. Baker, 41 National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of 
Wildlife,42 and Rapanos v. United States. 43  In Exxon Shipping v. Baker 
the Court unanimously rejected Exxon’s claim that punitive damage 
awards were preempted by federal law and confined its holding 
limiting punitive damage awards to cases arising under the federal 
common law of maritime.44  The Court’s decision in National 
Association of Home Builders imposed a significant limitation on the 
application of the Endangered Species Act to pre-existing statutory 
obligations, but in doing so it affirmed historical agency practice and 
long-standing lower court decisions on the question.  In Rapanos the 
Court adopted a potentially significant limitation on federal jurisdiction 
over wetlands lacking a “significant nexus” to navigable waters, but 
also reaffirmed that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and 
Environmental Protection Agency retain substantial authority to define 
 
 40. An earlier assessment, looking at just the Roberts Court’s first seven environmental 
decisions, likewise found “no discernable pro-business bias thus far.”  See David Schultz, 
Give A Hoot, Don’t Pollute: The Roberts Court and the Environment, 17 PENN. ST. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 191, 191 (2009). 
 41. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). 
 42. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007). 
 43. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 44. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct., at 2618–19. 
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“substantial nexus” so as to reclaim much of the jurisdictional ground 
that was lost. 
Insofar as these decisions are ‘pro-business” they are all quite 
modest.  Solid base hits, to be sure, but not home runs.  Their 
significance pales in comparison to Massachusetts v. EPA,45 by far the 
most significant environmental decision decided by the Roberts Court 
thus far.  Combined with the other cases in which the Court sided 
against business interests, it is difficult to argue that the Roberts 
Court’s environmental decisions have been of net benefit to business 
interests. 
Eight of the Roberts Court’s environmental decisions could be 
considered “pro-business.”  These decisions are Rapanos v. United 
States,46 Rockwell International Corp. v. United States,47 United States 
v. Atlantic Research Corp.,48 National Association of Home Builders v. 
Defenders of Wildlife,49 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,50 Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council,51 Summers v. Earth Island 
Institute,52 and Entergy Corporation v. Riverkeeper.53 
Exxon Shipping v. Baker received substantial attention as a “pro-
business” decision in part because of its storied history, and in part 
because it involved the largest punitive-damage award in American 
history.54  In March 1989, the Exxon Valdez supertanker ran aground 
off the coast of Alaska, spilling nearly eleven million barrels of oil into 
Prince William Sound.  Largely due to the sound’s remote location, 
cleanup efforts were delayed and the spill quickly spread to cover 
thousands of square miles of ocean.  Exxon pleaded guilty to various 
environmental violations, and several lawsuits followed, one of which 
led to a jury award of just over $500 million in compensatory damages 
and $5 billion in punitive damages, subsequently reduced to $2.5 
billion on appeal.55 
A divided Court struck down the punitive damage award, holding 
that a compensatory-to-punitive ratio greater than 1:1 is excessive 
under the federal common law of admiralty.56  This was a significant 
 
 45. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 46. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715. 
 47. Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007). 
 48. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007). 
 49. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007). 
 50. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). 
 51. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
52 Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S.Ct. 442 (2009). 
53 Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., __ S.Ct. __ (2009). 
 54. Rosen, supra note 1. 
 55. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2614. 
 56. Id. at 2634. 
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victory for Exxon, but it was a less significant victory for business 
generally. First, and perhaps most importantly, the Court’s holding 
limiting the award of punitive damages to an amount equal to the 
compensatory damages was confined to the federal maritime common 
law, and there is little reason to believe the Court would impose an 
equivalent limit in constitutional challenges to punitive damages.  
Among other things, two of the Justices who joined the judgment of the 
Court—Justices Thomas and Scalia—did so explicitly on the grounds 
that the Court’s holding was so limited and reaffirmed their opposition 
to imposing any constitutional limitations on punitive damages in state 
court.57  Moreover, the Court allowed the imposition of punitive 
damages even though the underlying conduct was neither intentional 
nor profitable for Exxon, leading some commentators to suggest the 
decision could be “a floor, rather than a ceiling” for cases in which the 
defendant’s conduct was more egregious.58 
While the Court’s punitive damages holding grabbed the 
headlines, another aspect of Exxon Shipping could well have a greater 
impact on environmental law.  Specifically, the Court unanimously 
rejected Exxon’s argument that punitive damages in water pollution 
cases are preempted by the Clean Water Act (CWA).59  Writing for a 
unanimous Court, Justice Souter explained there was little indication 
Congress sought to “occupy the entire field of pollution remedies” and 
no reason to believe that “punitive damages for private harms will have 
any frustrating effect on the CWA remedial scheme.”60  This is 
potentially significant as common law claims for punitive damages 
under federal maritime law are relatively rare, whereas industry claims 
that state tort remedies are preempted by federal statute are more 
common.  Moreover, the Court’s anti-preemption holding in Exxon 
Shipping is rather conspicuous as business preemption claims have 
prevailed in the majority of preemption cases decided by the Roberts 
Court thus far. 
The Court’s decision in Rapanos was a victory for business 
interests insofar as it reaffirmed the Court’s prior holding that federal 
regulatory jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” is limited.61  
 
 57. Id. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 58. See Ted Frank, The Era of Big Punitive Damage Awards Is Not Over, WALL ST. J., 
July 10, 2008, at A13. 
 59. Exxon Shipping, 128 S.Ct. at 2619. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).  For a more extended analysis of 
the Rapanos decision see Jonathan H. Adler, Reckoning with Rapanos: Revisiting “Waters 
of the United States” and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 14 MO. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Adler, Reckoning] and Jonathan H. Adler, Once More, 
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In Rapanos, a slim and divided majority rejected the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s expansive interpretation of federal 
regulatory jurisdiction, but could not agree on a single rationale.  The 
Court splintered 4-1-4, limiting the decision’s scope and creating 
uncertainty about the precise contours of the Court’s holding.  Despite 
the failure to produce a majority opinion, the Rapanos court reaffirmed 
the central holding of the Court’s 2000 decision in Solid Waste Agency 
v. United States Army Corps of Engineers62 that “waters of the United 
States” only extend to those waters and wetlands that have a 
“significant nexus” to truly navigable waters and are “inseparably 
bound up with the ‘waters’ of the United States,”63 and made clear that 
CWA jurisdiction has meaningful limits. 
Four of the justices in Rapanos joined an opinion by Justice Scalia 
holding that federal jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” 
under the Clean Water Act could only extend to “those wetlands with a 
continuous surface connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the United 
States’ in their own right, so that there is no clear demarcation between 
‘waters’ and wetlands, are ‘adjacent to’ such waters and covered by the 
Act.”64 A fifth justice, Justice Kennedy, held that “Corps’ jurisdiction 
over wetlands depends upon the existence of a significant nexus 
between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in a traditional 
sense.”65 
After Rapanos, federal regulators must make a greater showing 
than many lower courts had required to assert federal jurisdiction over 
privately owned wetlands adjacent to or near tributaries of navigable 
waters.  Insofar as federal regulations purport to define “waters of the 
United States” to include intrastate waters “the use, degradation, or 
destruction of which could effect interstate commerce or foreign 
commerce,”66 and wetlands adjacent to such waters,67 they exceed the 
scope of federal Clean Water Act jurisdiction.  Yet the benefits of 
Rapanos for the regulated community have been rather limited.  The 
divided nature of the Court’s decision in Rapanos has resulted in some 
 
With Feeling: Reaffirming the Limits of Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, in THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS 81 (L. Kinvin Wroth ed., 2007). 
 62. Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 63. Id. at 168 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 134 
(1985)). 
 64. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 740 (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.). 
 65. Id. at 779 (emphasis added) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. 
at 767 (“Absent a significant nexus, jurisdiction under the Act is lacking.”).  According to 
Justice Kennedy, “navigable waters” are “waters that are or were navigable in fact, or that 
could reasonably be so made.”  Id. at 758. 
 66. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2008). 
 67. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7). 
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amount of regulatory uncertainty, as lower courts, federal regulators, 
and the regulated community struggled to sort out the decision’s 
implications.68  Furthermore, neither of the opinions of those justices 
who joined in the judgment impose stringent limits on future assertions 
of regulatory jurisdiction.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion provides federal 
regulators with ample room to delineate the sorts of ecological factors 
that may be used to demonstrate that there is a “significant nexus” 
between a given wetland and navigable waters.  Justice Scalia’s 
opinion also provides more leeway than some may realize, as key 
portions of the opinion are conspicuously couched in the language of 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council step-two, 
suggesting at least some of the concurring justices would accept a more 
expansive reading of CWA jurisdiction adopted pursuant to a notice-
and-comment rulemaking.69 
The Court reached a somewhat similar result in another Clean 
Water Act case, Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, in which the Court 
upheld the Environmental Protection Agency’s reliance upon cost-
benefit analysis in setting technology standards for powerplant cooling 
water intake structures.70  Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act 
requires adoption of the “best technology available for minimizing 
adverse environmental impact” from the withdrawal of water for the 
cooling of power facilities.71  Pursuant to this requirement, in 2004 the 
EPA adopted performance standards requiring existing covered 
facilities to dramatically reduce the mortality of aquatic organisms 
through the use of various technologies the EPA deemed to be 
commercially available and economically practicable.”72  The EPA 
declined to adopt more stringent standards, such as a requirement that 
all regulated facilities adopt closed-cycle cooling systems or their 
equivalent, because they were deemed too costly in relation to the 
additional environmental benefits from adopting such technologies.  
 
 68. Some of the lower court decisions interpreting Rapanos are discussed in Adler, 
Reckoning, supra note 58. 
 69. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739 (“The Corps’ expansive interpretation of the ‘waters 
of the United States’ is . . . not ‘based on a permissible construction of the statute.’ ”) (citing 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).  Under Chevron, 
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions may receive deference from courts 
provided that, among other things, the interpretation is “based on a permissible 
construction” of the relevant statutory text.  See id. 
70 __ S.Ct. __ (2009). 
71 33 U.S.C. §1326(b). 
72 69 Fed. Reg. 41602.  These so-called “Phase II” standards apply to facilities 
that withdraw at least 50 million gallons of water per day, at least one-quarter 
of which is used for cooling purposes. Id. at 41576. 
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Specifically, EPA concluded a more stringent standard would increase 
industry compliance costs nine-fold but not generate significant 
offsetting environmental benefits.73 
Environmentalist organizations challenged the cooling water 
intake standards arguing the EPA to consider economic costs and 
benefits when setting standards under Section 316(b) in all but the most 
extreme circumstances.  Six justices rejected this argument, concluding 
that the relevant statutory language is sufficiently ambiguous to allow 
the EPA to consider the relevant costs and benefits when identifying 
the “best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental 
impact.”  Writing for five justices, Justice Scalia explained that the 
“best” technology could be that which generates the least adverse 
environmental impacts, but could also be “the technology that most 
efficiently” reduces adverse environmental impacts.74   Justice Breyer, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, likewise concluded that the 
Clean Water Act permitted at least the limited use of cost-benefit 
comparisons in setting technology standards for cooling water intake 
structures.75 
While the Court upheld the use of cost-benefit comparisons under 
Section 316(b), it explicitly held that whether to rely upon such 
analyses was left to the discretion of the EPA.  Under the Court’s 
reading, the relevant statutory language neither required nor prohibited 
the use of such analyses, and the EPA remains free to alter its 
regulatory approach in the future.  Thus, while the Court upheld a 
relatively pro-business regulatory policy in Entergy, it also left the 
EPA ample ability to implement Section 316(b) in a more stringent and 
less business friendly manner in the future.In National Association of 
Home Builders, the Court decided on the application of the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA) consultation requirements to arguably non-
discretionary decisions under other laws.76  At issue was whether the 
Environmental Protection Agency was required to engage in section 
seven consultation under the ESA before transferring permitting 
authority to a state environmental agency as provided for under the 
Clean Water Act.  Section seven of the ESA requires all federal 
agencies to consult with the Fish & Wildlife Service or National 
Marine Fisheries Service to ensure that no action “authorized, funded, 
or carried out” by such agencies will jeopardize an endangered or 
 
73 See Entergy, __ S.Ct. at __ (slip op. at 5). 
74 Id.(emphasis in original) (slip op. at 8). 
75 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 76. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007). 
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threatened species.77  Under the CWA, however, the EPA is required to 
approve the transfer of National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) permitting authority to a state if nine statutorily 
specified criteria are met.78  In this case, the EPA approved the transfer 
of permitting authority to the State of Arizona, even though this could 
lead to the issuance of NPDES permits without considering the 
potential impact on certain endangered species, because it determined 
that Arizona met the nine criteria specified in the CWA. 
National Association of Home Builders was a close case.  
Upholding the EPA determination would blunt the impact of the ESA, 
but would keep the permit transfer provisions of the CWA intact.  
Reversing the EPA determination could significantly expand the 
universe of agency decisions now subject to potential ESA 
consultation.  Faced with this choice, the Court sided with the EPA’s 
interpretation.  This was a “pro-business” decision because the Court 
refused to impose the ESA’s consultation requirements on agency 
decisions traditionally made in accordance with specified statutory 
criteria.  The impact of this decision is rather minimal, however, as it 
does little to change the status quo.79  Thus, while a contrary decision 
might have been a significant loss for business interests, the Court’s 
decision may not amount to much of a victory. 
The obligation of federal agencies to take actions protecting 
animal species was also at issue in Winter v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, in which the Court was asked to resolve a conflict 
between the military and marine mammals.80  Several environmental 
organizations had successfully sought a preliminary injunction against 
the Navy’s use of mid-frequency active sonar because it had failed to 
complete an Environmental Impact Statement.  As first presented to the 
Court, it looked like a potential blockbuster, raising interesting 
separation of powers questions, such as the ability of the executive to 
authorize noncompliance with environmental statutes.  Yet as it 
happened, the ultimate disposition of the case was rather narrow.  
Ruling 6-3, the Court overturned the preliminary injunction on the 
grounds that the U.S. Court of Appeals had applied too loose a standard 
 
 77. See 16 U.S. C. § 1536 (a)(2) (2006). 
 78. See 33 U.S.C. §1342(c) (2006). 
 79. Two of the three appellate courts to have considered this question reached the same 
conclusion as the Supreme Court.  See Am. Forest & Paper Ass’n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291 (5th 
Cir. 1998); Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, 962 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  The third was the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, see Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 
2006), rev’d 551 U.S. 644 (2007). 
 80. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
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and that that the potential threat to marine mammals was outweighed 
by the national interest in military readiness.81  As with National 
Association of Home Builders, this was an outcome favored by 
business interests, but unlikely to have a substantial practical effect.  
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Court in Winter stresses the 
importance of military readiness throughout, making it likely that the 
decision will have minimal effects in other contexts.82 
Summers v. Earth Island Institute was a small and predictable win 
for the pro-business decision insofar as it reaffirmed the Court’s long-
standing requirement that citizen-suit plaintiffs suffer an injury-in-fact 
in order to satisfy the requirements of Article III standing.83  In 
Summers, environmentalist plaintiffs had sought to challenge to a 
revision of U.S. Forest Service regulations governing small-scale fire-
rehabilitation and timber-salvage projects.  In 2003, they challenged 
the regulatory revisions as applied to a specific project, but the 
government eventually settled, creating a standing problem insofar as 
they sought to maintain their suit against the underlying procedural rule 
change.  No longer able to identify a specific project that would be 
affected by the rule that could be the source of their injury, the 
Supreme Court held, 5-4, that they no longer had standing to maintain 
their suit because they could not demonstrate they would suffer an 
“injury-in-fact” that is both actual or imminent and concrete and 
particularized.  Just as the plaintiffs in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 
could not satisfy the injury requirement with their someday intentions 
to visit endangered species threatened by the government’s failure to 
enforce Endangered Species Act limitations on federally funded 
projects overseas, the Summers plaintiffs could not satisfy the injury 
requirement by arguing that implementation of the Forest Service’s 
regulation would result in an unlawful timber-salvage project on an as-
yet-unidentified parcel at some as-yet-unidentified point in the future.84 
 
 81. Id. at 376 (“[E]ven if plaintiffs have shown irreparable injury from the Navy’s 
training exercises, any such injury is outweighed by the public interest and the Navy’s 
interest in effective, realistic training of its sailors.  A proper consideration of these factors 
alone requires denial of the requested injunctive relief.”). 
 82. Chief Justice Roberts decision opened quoting President George Washington: “To 
be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.” Id. at 370 
(quoting George Washington, U.S. President, First Annual Address (Jan. 8, 1790), in 1 
JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS 68 (2004)).  The opinion ended quoting President Theodore Roosevelt that “the 
only way in which a navy can ever be made efficient is by practice at sea, under all the 
conditions which would have to be met if war existed.” Id. at 382 (quoting President’s 
Annual Message, 42 CONG. REC. 67, 81 (1907)). 
83 129 S.Ct. 442 (2009). 
84 See id.  at __ (slip op. at 7-8). 
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 By rejecting standing “in the absence of a live dispute over a 
concrete application” of specific regulations,85 Summers reaffirmed the 
Court’s hostility to programmatic public interest litigation.  The rule 
reaffirmed in Summers makes it more difficult to challenge underlying 
policy changes, as prospective plaintiffs need to identify how the 
policy change, as applied in a specific context, tangibly harms their 
interests.  Industry amici supported this result insofar as they sought to 
reduce citizen-suit litigation against projects on federal lands, 
particularly where (as in this case) such suits result in nationwide 
injunctions.  Resource-using industries active on federal lands, such as 
the timber industry, also sought to insulate the contested Forest Service 
rule from legal challenge.  Forcing environmentalist groups to 
challenge individual applications of a given policy change would make 
it more difficult to overturn the underlying rule.  Yet Summers broke 
no meaningfully new ground in the law of standing, and was thus not a 
particularly significant win for business interests. 
The final two pro-business decisions are also rather minor.  In 
Atlantic Research v. United States, the Court unanimously affirmed 
that companies that engage in voluntary clean ups of hazardous waste 
sites may pursue recovery actions against other potentially responsible 
parties under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Cleanup, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA, aka “Superfund”).  This case was a pro-
business decision insofar as a private company had sought cost 
recovery from the United States government, and other companies in 
equivalent situations will be able to seek cost recovery, as has long 
been assumed.  Yet its pro-business effect is somewhat limited, as it 
also opens the door to cost recovery actions against private firms. 
In Rockwell International Corp. v. United States,86 the Court made 
it marginally more difficult for alleged whistleblowers to bring qui tam 
actions under the False Claims Act, but does nothing to prevent such 
suits by the federal government itself.  One of the primary practical 
effects of this decision is that government contractors sued under the 
False Claims Act are less likely to face requests for attorneys fees from 
such suits, a result business certainly favors.  This may also have the 
result of reducing the overall number of such suits.  Insofar as it is a 
victory for business, however, it is significant for government 
contractors, not the business community at large. 
Contrasting the cases in which business emerged victorious with 
those in which business lost demonstrates that the Roberts Court’s 
 
85 Id. at __ (slip op. at 1). 
 86. Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 548 U.S. 941 (2006). 
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environmental cases have not been, on the whole, “pro-business.”87  
The most important environmental case decided by the Roberts 
Court—indeed, one of the most important cases of any sort decided in 
the past three years—was Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the Court 
both loosened the standing requirements for litigants seeking greater 
federal regulation, expanded the scope of the Clean Air Act to cover 
the most ubiquitous by-products of industrial civilization, and (as a 
practical matter) requires federal regulation of greenhouse gases.88  As 
a substantive matter, this case alone is more adverse to business 
interests than all of the business “wins” put together.  Several singles 
don’t matter all that much if one’s opponent responds with a grand 
slam. 
As a legal matter, the most significant aspect of Massachusetts v. 
EPA may be its treatment of standing.  Not only did the Court apply the 
traditional requirements for Article III standing in a particularly 
undemanding fashion, it also announced a new rule of “special 
solicitude” for states and potentially expanded the ability of citizen suit 
plaintiffs to meet standing’s causation and redressability requirements.  
Whereas Summers largely reaffirmed the Court’s traditional standing 
requirements, as articulated in Lujan, Massachusetts opened the door to 
additional litigation by those seeking to increase the stringency of 
federal environmental regulations. 
In a surprising move, the Massachusetts majority proclaimed that 
state standing claims are “entitled to special solicitude” in federal 
court.89  The Court rested this holding on a century-old case, Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper.90 In this case, a downwind state, Georgia, sought 
judicial relief from upwind pollution under the federal common law of 
interstate nuisance.  Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, looked 
favorably on Georgia’s claims and held the state could seek equitable 
relief that was potentially unavailable to private litigants.  This case 
may have established an important principle about the availability of 
equitable relief for state litigants, but it had little to do with Article III 
standing. Indeed, this may explain why the case was not cited in a 
single brief filed with the Court.91 
 
 87. It should be reiterated that the claim of this paper is not that these decisions have 
been “anti-business.”  Rather, the claim is simply that there is no evidence of a pro-business 
bias or pro-business pattern of decisions. 
 88. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 89. Id. at 518. 
 90. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
 91. The first mention of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper in the Massachusetts v. EPA 
litigation came during oral argument when it was referenced by Justice Kennedy.  See 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Mass, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1120). 
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While the Massachusetts majority could have grounded their 
newfound approach to state standing in the framework provided by 
prior court decisions, such as Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto 
Rico ex rel Barez,92 it did not.  If vindicating state interests was so 
important, the Court could also have relied upon other state sovereign 
interests, such as a state’s interest in preventing the potential federal 
preemption of its own laws.  This view was actually urged upon the 
Court by state amici.93  Yet the Court did not adopt the approach 
actually urged by the state petitioners or amici, opting to invent a new 
doctrine of “special solicitude” instead.  This newfound “special 
solicitude” for state litigants could help ease the way for greater legal 
activism by state attorneys general, including so-called “regulation by 
litigation.”94  States increasingly use litigation as a means of pursuing 
social and environmental policy goals, and Massachusetts v. EPA could 
make it easier for state attorneys general to pursue such strategies in 
federal court. 
The newfound “solicitude” for states was not the only alteration of 
standing doctrine in Massachusetts.  The Court also made it easier for 
prospective petitioners to overcome the causation and redressability 
prongs of the Article III standing requirements.  In Lujan the Court had 
held that the “normal standards for redressability and immediacy” are 
relaxed when a statute vests a litigant with a “procedural right.”95  This 
is the rationale for recognizing environmental litigants’ standing to 
enforce the National Environmental Policy Act and other laws that 
impose only procedural obligations on regulatory agencies.  In 
Massachsuetts the Court concluded that the petitioners should get the 
benefit of this relaxed standing standard.  According to Justice Stevens’ 
opinion, section 307 of the Clean Air Act accorded plaintiffs a 
“procedural right” justifying a relaxation of “the normal standards of 
redressability and immediacy” under Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.96  
 
 92. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R. ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982). 
 93. This argument was made in an amicus curiae brief in Massachusetts v. EPA 
submitted on behalf of several states.  See Brief of the States of Arizona & Iowa et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Massachusett., 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1120), 
available at http://www.communityrights.org/PDFs/MassBriefs/Mass%20v%20EPA--
Amici%20States.pdf.  For a critique of these alternative arguments for state standing, see 
Brief of The Cato Institute and Law Professors Jonathan H. Adler, James L. Huffman, and 
Andrew P. Morriss as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 14, Massachusetts, 549 
U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120), at 14–17, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/legalbriefs/ma_v_epa_10-24-06.pdf. 
 94. See generally ANDREW P. MORRISS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION (2008); 
REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002). 
 95. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 96. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517. 
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This is potentially quite significant, as section 307 is just a 
jurisdictional provision, and not a source of procedural rights.  Indeed, 
such language has never before been construed to establish a 
procedural right in a standing case.  In his majority opinion, Justice 
Stevens acknowledged that for the Court to recognize a procedural 
right that would justify a lowering of the standing bar, “Congress must 
at least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to 
the class of persons entitled to bring suit.”97  Yet section 307 does 
nothing of the sort.  It simply identifies which challenges to EPA 
rulemakings under the Clean Air Act must be filed in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for D.C. Circuit, as opposed to those that must be filed in 
regional circuit courts of appeals.  Yet due to the Court’s innovative 
reading of this provision, the familiar requirements explicated in Lujan 
may well present a less daunting challenge to future litigants in 
regulatory matters. 
As a practical matter, Massachusetts v. EPA is also a 
tremendously important case because it will trigger the federal 
regulation of greenhouse gases, most notably carbon dioxide, the most 
ubiquitous by-product of modern industrial civilization.  While the 
Court specifically eschewed directly mandating that the EPA regulate, 
instead remanding the matter back to the Agency for further 
proceedings given the EPA’s failure to offer a “reasoned explanation 
for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute 
to climate change,”98 there is little doubt that such regulation will 
result. 
Section 202 of the Clean Air Act provides that the EPA “shall” set 
emission standards for new vehicles for “any air pollutant” the 
Administrator concludes causes or contributes to air pollution, “which 
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”99  
Once it is established that greenhouse gases are air pollutants for the 
purpose of this provision, the EPA has little choice to regulate unless it 
is prepared to argue that the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere cannot “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.”  Even were the current EPA inclined to question 
 
 97. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 98. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517. 
 99. Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act provides, in relevant part: 
The  Administrator shall  by regulation  prescribe . . . standards applicable to the 
emission of any air pollutant from any class or  classes of new  motor vehicles or 
new motor vehicle  engines, which  in his  judgment  cause, or contribute   to,  air   
pollution  which   may  reasonably be anticipated  to  endanger   public  health  or   
welfare. 
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). 
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this assumption, the agency’s own prior statements and actions 
virtually compel a finding that greenhouse gas emissions could harm 
public health or welfare.  Indeed, in the very Federal Register notice in 
which the Bush EPA disclaimed any authority over such emissions, the 
agency nonetheless reaffirmed the need to address climate change and 
“reduce the risk” posed by a warming planet.100 
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles 
is only the beginning, however.  The same finding that triggers 
regulation under section 202 will trigger regulation under other 
provisions of the Clean Air Act as well.  Section 111, for instance, 
requires the Agency to set emission performance standards for 
stationary sources that “cause[] or contribute[] significantly to, air  
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.”101  If greenhouse gases satisfy the requirements of 
Section 202, they will almost certainly satisfy this provision as well. 
It’s also quite possible that a finding of endangerment under 
Section 202 could force the EPA to set national air quality standards 
for greenhouse gases, giving state and federal regulators a truly 
Sisiphysean task.  Section 108 of the Clean Air Act requires EPA to set 
such standards for any pollutant, “emissions of which, in [the EPA 
Administrator’s] judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution which 
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare” 
that is emitted into the ambient air by “numerous or diverse mobile or 
stationary sources.”102  The finding necessary to trigger this section is 
essentially the same as that for sections 202 and 111. 
Setting a standard under section 108 would, in turn, require states 
to develop and issue “state implementation plans” for how 
metropolitan areas would meet the standard.  Here is where the real 
difficulties would begin.  There is simply no way for states, acting 
independently through the State Implementation Plan process provided 
for under the Clean Air Act or otherwise, to comply with federal 
standards for ambient levels of greenhouse gases.  Such gases are 
dispersed throughout the global atmosphere.  Carbon dioxide emissions 
anywhere on the planet contribute to global concentrations of 
greenhouse gases, and any benefit from emission reductions in any one 
place are dispersed across the globe.  As a consequence, there is 
nothing any given jurisdiction can do to comply with a federal carbon 
dioxide standard unless emissions are controlled worldwide.103 
 
 100. 68 Fed. Reg. 52925 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
 101. 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 7408. 
 103. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate 
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Yet Massachusetts v. EPA was not the only loss for the business 
community.  The Court rebuffed challenges to the application of 
environmental laws to various business activities, as in S.D. Warren 
Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection104 and Environmental 
Defense v. Duke Energy.105  S.D. Warren was a rather straightforward 
case in which the Court unanimously rejected S.D. Warren’s 
contention that a hydroelectric dam that removes and then redeposits 
water from a river results in a “discharge into the navigable waters,” 
requiring state certification under the Clean Water Act.  Environmental 
Defense, on the other hand, is a potentially significant case. 
At issue in Environmental Defense was when repair, maintenance, 
and upgrades at coal-fired utilities constitute a “modification” that 
triggers the imposition of emission controls under the EPA’s “new 
source review” program.  For years, the EPA and the utility industry 
sparred over whether new source review controls were triggered by an 
increase in a facility’s actual emissions, or just by increases in a 
facility’s rate of emissions.  At stake was whether utilities and other 
industrial facilities covered by the federal Clean Air Act would be 
required to install costly pollution controls when maintaining or 
upgrading older facilities.  According to various industry groups, 
EPA’s interpretation could expose many facilities to “New Source 
Review” requirements when engaging in fairly routine maintenance 
and upkeep.106  A study released by the National Rural Electric 
Cooperative Association asserted that a loss for Duke Energy would 
increase energy costs and undermine power reliability, particularly in 
rural areas.107  Although the specific statutory holding was rather 
narrow, the case was significant.  In siding with the EPA’s 
interpretation of its own regulations and statutory interpretation, the 
Court strengthened the agency’s hand in a series of enforcement 
actions against utilities under this program. 
In United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste 
 
Policies, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 101, 105 (2007) (“[L]ocal abatement actions pose local 
costs, yet deliver essentially no local climate benefits.”). 
 104. S.D. Warren Co., v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370 (2006). 
 105. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy, 549 U.S. 561 (2007). 
 106. See Brief for Manufacturers Association Work Group as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Envtl. Def., 549 U.S. 561 (No. 05-848). 
 107. Bernard L. Weinstein & Terry L. Clower, Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy: 
How a Supreme Court Reversal on the Interpretation of New Source Review Could Imperil 
Rural America (Oct. 2006), 
http://www.nreca.org/Documents/PublicPolicy/Newsourcereviewupdate10-06.pdf; see also 
Bernard L. Weinstein & Terry L. Clower, The EPA’s Reinterpretation of New Source 
Review Rules: Implications for Economic Development in Rural America (May 2002), 
http://www.unt.edu/cedr/NSR.pdf. 
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Management Authority, the Court took a small step back from 
protecting private waste management firms from solid waste flow 
control ordinances and government-sanctioned monopolies.108  In 1994, 
in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, the Court had held that the 
Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits local communities from 
enforcing local flow control ordinances that require waste haulers to 
send all waste to a single private waste processing facility.109  In United 
Haulers, the Court announced that the Carbone rule only applies to 
private facilities, and that the dormant commerce clause does not 
prohibit local communities from enacting an identical statute for the 
benefit of a public waste processing facility, clearing the way for the 
creation of government-run monopoly waste processing services and 
the balkanization of interstate markets in waste management services.  
This is a setback for business interests in two respects.  First, it makes 
it easier for local governments to regulate and control private waste 
flows.  Second, the decision may indicate the Court is backing away 
from strict enforcement of Dormant Commerce Clause limitations on 
local government actions that tend to balkanize interstate markets in 
waste management services. 
In several other cases, the Court either expanded the government’s 
ability to impose on business interests or limited the ability of 
businesses to challenge government regulations.  In BP America 
Production Co. v. Burton, the Court unanimously held that the standard 
six-year statute of limitations for government contract actions did not 
apply to administrative payment orders for offshore gas royalty 
underpayments issued by the Minerals Management Service.110  Yet in 
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States the Court held that the 
statute of limitations governing takings claims against the federal 
government in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims is “jurisdictional,” and 
bars takings claims even if waived by the government.111  Thus, in 
these cases the Court made it easier for the government to seek royalty 
payments for private firms, but more difficult for private firms to 
pursue takings claims against the government. 
This tendency to tilt the playing field against business litigants can 
also be seen in Wilkie v. Robbins.112  In this case, a private landowner 
sued Bureau of Land Management employees for allegedly seeking to 
 
 108. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 
(2007). 
 109. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). 
 110. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84 (2006). 
 111. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008). 
 112. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
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coerce him into giving the government an easement across his land.  
The landowner alleged a pattern of egregious conduct, ranging from 
selective enforcement of federal regulations to tortuous interference 
with his business and intrusion upon the privacy of his guests, all 
aimed at getting him to cede a property interest.113  This pattern of 
conduct, he alleged, should give rise to a Bivens action, or other legal 
remedies in federal court, as the government should not be able to 
retaliate against a landowner for refusing to cede his constitutionally 
protected property rights. 
The Court rejected the landowner’s claim, refusing to allow for a 
Bivens-like action in an area where such actions had not been 
recognized before.  Although this case involved a ranch owner, rather 
than a large corporation, it was closely watched by industries that use 
or rely upon federal lands.  Several trade associations, including the 
Public Lands Council and various cattlemen’s associations, filed 
amicus briefs on the landowner’s behalf fearing that a decision for the 
government could strengthen the hand of government agencies vis-à-
vis resource-dependent industries that operate on federal lands.  Thus, 
even if this decision did not directly involve business interests, it 
adopted a rule that could be averse to those businesses that routinely 
operate on federal lands. 
As a suit between two states over the interpretation of a century-
old interstate compact, New Jersey v. Delaware114 might not seem like 
an environmental case that implicated business interests at all.  Yet the 
underlying dispute concerned the proposed construction of a liquefied 
natural gas unloading terminal to be operated by a subsidiary of British 
Petroleum.115 The legal question was whether New Jersey could 
authorize the construction of an improvement that would extend off of 
New Jersey’s shore into Delaware’s territory.  This required 
interpreting the 1905 Compact between the two states governing 
riparian improvements made in the Delaware River, to determine 
whether Delaware could prohibit New Jersey’s planned development. 
In the end, the Court sided with Delaware, holding that New 
Jersey could not unilaterally authorize construction.  If the facility was 
to proceed, both states would have to give the go ahead.  Had the Court 
sought to interpret the Compact so as to facilitate economic 
development, it might have refused to adopt an interpretation of the 
compact that would subject facilities of this sort to the overlapping 
jurisdiction of both states.  This was the position urged by Justice 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. New Jersey v. Delaware, 128 S. Ct. 1410 (2008). 
 115. Id. at 1417–18. 
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Scalia in dissent.  He argued that if certain portions of the Compact 
were read to give one state a veto over such projects undertaken by the 
other, it would negate the utility of giving each state exclusive 
jurisdiction over wharfing out projects from its own side of the river.116  
Whether or not this is the proper interpretation of the Compact, it is the 
interpretation one might have expected from a Court concerned about 
facilitating business activity and economic development. 
III. PRO-BUSINESS OR PRO-GOVERNMENT? 
The Roberts Court’s environmental decisions issued to date 
suggest neither a disposition toward business nor a hostility toward 
environmental regulation.  The “pro-business” position has prevailed in 
some cases, and lost in others.  If the relative magnitude of the cases is 
taken into account, it is even more difficult to argue that the Roberts 
Court has been “pro-business” in this area. 
While there is no evidence of a “pro-business” orientation in the 
environmental cases decided by the Roberts Court to date, there may be 
evidence of something else.  Business interests may not have prevailed 
too often, but governmental interests did.  The federal government’s 
position prevailed in nine of the thirteen cases in which it took a 
position, including four in which the federal government adopted the 
“pro-business” position.117  In a tenth case—United Haulers 
Association—a local government prevailed against private parties.118  
Thus, in ten of fourteen cases—over two-thirds of the relevant 
environmental cases—the government position prevailed. 
This pattern is even more striking when one considers the cases in 
which the federal government lost.  In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court 
rejected the position advocated by the federal government.119  Yet the 
case’s outcome can still be considered “pro-government” in many 
respects.  Massachusetts and other state governments were among the 
prevailing parties, and the Court stressed the importance of that fact in 
resolving the standing issue.  It announced that state governments, as 
sovereign entities, were entitled to a “special solicitude” in the standing 
inquiry, thereby privileging state litigants over others. 
 
 116. Id. at 1430 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
 117. These two cases are National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of 
Wildlife and Natural Resources Defense Council v. Winter. 
 118. The remaining cases, New Jersey v. Delaware, 128 S. Ct. 1410 (2008), and Exxon 
Shipping v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008), pitted two states against each other and two 
private parties against each other respectively.   In the former case, however, the court 
adopted a “pro-government” position insofar as it approved a compact interpretation that 
provides for overlapping and duplicative jurisdiction. 
 119. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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Massachusetts v. EPA is “pro-government” in another respect: the 
decision greatly expanded federal regulatory authority and will result in 
a significant increase in federal environmental regulation.  Further, in 
holding that greenhouse gases are subject to regulation as “pollutants” 
under the Clean Air Act, and forcing the EPA to base its decision on 
whether to regulate such emissions upon its assessment of existing 
climate science, the Court effectively ensured that the EPA will 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, as well as 
from stationary sources, including many emission sources which have 
never before been regulated under federal law. 
The federal government lost in Atlantic Research, but this 
decision has no impact on the federal government’s ability to 
implement the federal Superfund program.  If anything, by reaffirming 
the ability of companies to seek cost recovery from other potentially 
responsible parties for voluntary cleanup actions, it serves the 
government’s broader interest in ensuring the quick and cost-effective 
cleanup of hazardous waste sites.120  The government nominally lost in 
Rockwell International as well, but it is again difficult to argue that the 
decision meaningfully compromised the federal government’s interests.  
By narrowing the scope of the “original source” exception to the 
“public disclosure bar” on federal court jurisdiction over qui tam 
actions under the False Claims Act, the Court did not prevent the 
federal government from continuing to pursue such claims.  To the 
contrary, in Rockwell the Court left the action by the Attorney General 
against Rockwell in place and suggested it would be “bizarre” to set 
aside the government’s judgment because of a lack of jurisdiction over 
the qui tam relator’s claim.121 
Rapanos is the only decision of the Roberts Court that imposed 
any meaningful limit on federal regulatory authority.  Yet, as discussed 
above, the impact of this decision is relatively modest.  The disposition 
of Rapanos leaves the federal government with ample room to impose 
extensive regulation on wetlands should the EPA and Army Corps of 
Engineers elect to revise their regulations.  The Court certainly hinted 
that federal regulation of private land use is subject to federalism 
limitations, but it refrained from explicitly imposing such a limit, 
further blunting the impact of the holding.122 
 
 120. See Jeffrey M. Gaba, United States v. Atlantic Research: The Supreme Court 
Almost Gets It Right, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10810, 10816 (2007) (“Atlantic Research was an 
important step in ensuring that the remedial objectives of CERCLA are satisfied.”). 
 121. Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 477–78 (2007). 
122 Indeed, John Rapanos may not have considered the decision much of a victory, as he 
ended up paying a $150,000 settlement and agreeing to construct 100 acres of new wetlands 
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At the time of this writing, the Court has heard arguments in, but 
has yet to decide, two more potentially significant environmental cases.  
These pending cases are unlikely to disturb this paper’s conclusions, 
however.  The federal government is a party in each, and has adopted 
the “pro-business” position in one.  Thus, even if the Court adopts 
business-friendly positions in both of these cases, itwill still appear that 
the Roberts Court reaches “pro-government” results in environmental 
cases more often than “pro-business” results. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no meaningful evidence that the Roberts Court has 
adopted a substantive pro-business orientation in its environmental 
cases—at least not in those cases decided thus far.  This is a tentative 
conclusion, however.  There are two environmental cases still pending 
this term, concerning Superfund liability and  the scope of the Clean 
Water Act’s permitting requirements. Additional litigation on other 
enviornmental questions in the years to come could also alter the 
picture, particularly once the Court begins to hear challenges to the 
Obama Administration’s environmental initiatives. 
The lack of a pro-business orientation in the environmental 
context does not mean the Court is not more business-friendly in other 
areas, perhaps such as preemption, arbitration, or securities litigation.  
Yet while there are no signs of a business-friendly approach to 
environmental cases, there are signs the Court tends to favor 
governmental interests, and those of the federal government in 
particular.  Thus far in the Roberts Court, governmental interests have 
prevailed in environmental cases with greater frequency than business 
interests.  If this pattern continues, then whether the Court hands down 
business-friendly decisions may depend on whether the political 
branches are or continue to be receptive to business concerns. 
 
 
to compensate for those he destroyed.  See Ed White, Deal Reached in Decades-Old 
Michigan Wetlands Dispute, ASSOCIATED PRESS, DEC. 29, 2008, available at 
http://blog.cleveland.com/business/2008/12/deal_reached_in_decadesold_mic.html. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1.  Environmental Cases Heard by the Roberts Court 
Case Issue Vote 
Pro-
Business 
Outcome 
S.D. Warren Co. v. 
Maine Board of 
Environmental 
Protection 
547 U.S. 370 
(2006) 
Whether hydroelectric dam causes 
“discharge into the navigable waters” 
requiring state certification under 
Clean Water Act 
9–0 No 
Rapanos v. United 
States 
547 U.S. 715 
(2006) 
Whether (and when) wetlands 
adjacent to tributaries of navigable 
waters are “waters of the United 
States” under the Clean Water Act 
and applicable federal regulations 
5–4 Yes 
BP America 
Production Co. v. 
Burton 
549 U.S. 84 
(2006) 
Whether six-year statute of 
limitations for government contract 
actins applies to administrative 
payment orders for gas royalty 
underpayments issued by the 
Minerals Management Service 
7–0* No 
Rockwell 
International Corp. 
v. United States 
549 U.S. 457 
(2007) 
Whether “original source” 
requirement of False Claims Act is 
jurisdictional 
6–2† Yes 
Massachusetts v. 
EPA 
549 U.S. 497 
(2007) 
Whether EPA has authority to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
under the Clean Air Act 
5–4 No 
Environmental 
Defense v. Duke 
Energy Corp. 
549 U.S. 561 
(2007) 
Whether EPA is required to apply 
same definition of  “modification” 
for promulgation of PSD and NSPS 
standards under Clean Air Act 
5–4 No 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
 
Table 1.  Environmental Cases Heard by the Roberts Court (continued) 
Case Issue Vote 
Pro-
Business 
Outcome 
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United Haulers 
Association v. 
Oneida-Herkimer 
Solid Waste 
Management 
Authority 
550 U.S. 330 
(2007) 
Whether county flow control 
ordinances requiring use of state-
owned waste facilities violate the 
Dormant Commerce Clause 
6–3 No 
United States v. 
Atlantic Research 
Corp. 
127 S. Ct. 2331 
(2007) 
Whether CERCLA provides 
potentially responsible party a cause 
of action to recover costs of 
voluntary cleanup  
9–0 Yes 
 National 
Association of 
Home Builders v. 
Defenders of 
Wildlife 
127 S. Ct. 2518 
(2007) 
Whether consultation requirements 
under Endangered Species Act apply 
to non-discretionary federal agency 
decisions governed by explicit 
statutory criteria. 
5–4 Yes 
Wilkie v. Robbins 
127 S. Ct. 2588 
(2007) 
Whether landowner has private 
cause of action against Bureau of 
Land Management officials for effort 
to extort easement 
7–2 No 
John R. Sand & 
Gravel Co. v. United 
States 
128 S. Ct. 750 
(2008) 
Whether statute of limitations for 
takings claims against federal 
government is jurisdictional 
7–2 No 
New Jersey v. 
Delaware 
128 S. Ct. 1410 
(2008) 
Whether interstate compact granted 
New Jersey exclusive jurisdiction 
over riparian improvements 
extending beyond low-water mark 
6–2† No 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
 
Table 1.  Environmental Cases Heard by the Roberts Court (continued) 
Case Issue Vote 
Pro-
Business 
Outcome 
Exxon Shipping Co. 
v. Baker 
128 S. Ct. 2605 
(2008) 
Whether federal maritime common 
law limits amount of punitive 
damages awarded in suit for oil spill 
5–3‡ Yes 
Winter v. Natural Whether court of Appeals erred in 6–3 Yes 
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Resources Defense 
Council 
129 S. Ct. 365 
(2008) 
affirming preliminary injunction 
against use of Naval sonar for failure 
to comply with National 
Environmental Policy Act 
Summers, et al. v. 
Earth Island Institute 
Whether environmental organization 
has standing to challenge a change in 
Forest Service regulations absent 
live dispute over concrete applicaton 
of rule 
5-4 
  
Yes 
Entergy Corp. v. 
Riverkeeper 
Whether EPA may use cost-benefit 
analysis in determining what 
constitutes the “best technology 
available” to limit environmental 
effects of cooling water intake 
structures under the Clean Water Act
6-3 Yes 
 Pending Cases 
    
    
Coeur Alaska, Inc. 
v. Southeast Alaska 
Conservation 
Council 
Whether the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers may issue a permit under 
Section 404 for discharge of fill 
material otherwise subject to effluent 
limitations under the Clean Water 
Act 
… … 
Burlington Northern 
and Santa Fe 
Railway Company 
v. United States 
Whether (and when) it is appropriate 
to impose joint and several liability 
or apportion damages under 
CERCLA 
… … 
* Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer did not participate. 
† Justice Breyer did not participate. 
‡ Justice Alito did not participate 
